九号胡同

 找回密码
 注册
搜索
查看: 102|回复: 0

[政治] 448页通俄报告出炉!官方总结重点调查结果 I(独家中英对照)

[复制链接]

14万

主题

182

好友

260万

积分

超级版主

Rank: 8Rank: 8

开国元勋 股神 股神 胡同理事会 大资本家 大资本家 水龙王

发表于 2019-4-20 10:21 PM |显示全部楼层








448页通俄报告出炉!官方总结重点调查结果 I(独家中英对照)

界面地球姨 最天下 2019-04-19
532EDD3C-CFF9-4ADB-B814-E086F4775AD5.jpeg


最天下导读:


当地时间4月18日周四上午,美国司法部公开了“通俄门”特别调查组报告的修订版全文。


“通俄门”调查由特别检察官穆勒主导,调查报告分为上下两册,分别解释“勾结俄国”和“妨碍司法”两个议题。司法部律师已隐去大陪审团材料、情报机构采集的机密信息、与正在进行的调查有关的材料。


与此前已经公布过的四页司法部总结相比,这份长达448页的报告全文提供了关于穆勒调查的更为丰富的细节,被遮蔽的内容也比此前外界预料的要少。


美国司法部长、共和党人威廉·巴尔在周四的新闻发布会上称,“经过将近两年的调查、数千次传唤、数百个搜查令和证人询问,特别检察官(穆勒)证实,俄罗斯政府赞助了干预2016年美国总统大选的非法行动,但没有发现特朗普的竞选团队或其他美国人与俄罗斯的行动进行勾结。”


报告全文发布后,特朗普在推特上对穆勒进行了攻击。他发文称,穆勒长达22个月的调查是“有史以来最大的政治骗局”,是对“总统的骚扰”。


最天下(ID:theveryworld)独家翻译了报告的执行摘要部分。本篇为第一部分,有关俄罗斯干预美国大选和特朗普竞选团队与俄罗斯的联系。此外请留意最天下同时发布的报告第二部分,有关特朗普是否妨碍司法的调查。


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I

第一卷执行摘要


RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

俄罗斯社交媒体运动


The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation — a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and companies he controlled. Prigozhin is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering mission with instructions ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

调查能确定的最早的俄罗斯干预行为由互联网研究机构(IRA)所开展——这是一场旨在挑起和扩大美国政治和社会不和的社交媒体运动。IRA总部设在俄罗斯圣彼得堡,得到了俄罗斯寡头叶夫根尼·普里戈津和他控制的公司的资助。外界广泛报道称,普里戈津与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京存在联系,【删减】

2014年年中,IRA在【删减】的指示下将雇员派往美国执行情报收集任务。


The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed “information warfare.” The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton, The IRA’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II of this report details the Office’s investigation of the Russian social media campaign.

后来,IRA利用社交媒体账户和利益集团,通过所谓的“信息战”在美国政治体系中制造不和。这项干预活动在2014年和2015年是旨在破坏美国选举制度的笼统计划,到了2016年则演变成有利于候选人特朗普、贬低候选人(希拉里)克林顿的有针对性的活动。IRA的行动还包括以美国个人和实体的名义在社交媒体上购买政治广告,以及在美国境内举行政治集会。为了组织这些集会,IRA员工假扮成美国基层的实体和个人,并与特朗普的支持者和美国内特朗普竞选活动的官员进行了接触。调查没有发现任何美国人与IRA共谋或合作的证据。本报告第二节详细介绍了对俄罗斯社交媒体运动的调查情况。


RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS

俄罗斯黑客行动


At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations.

在2016年初,IRA行动开始专注于支持候选人特朗普的同时,俄罗斯政府采用了第二种形式的干预:网络入侵(黑客),以及发布对克林顿竞选团队有害的,受到黑客入侵的材料。俄罗斯情报部门,即俄罗斯陆军总参谋部情报总局(GRU,格鲁乌)开展了这些行动。


In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government’s role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0.” The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign” or “Campaign") showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage candidate Clinton. Beginning in June 2016, ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate Clinton. WikiLeaks’s first release came in July 2016. Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server used by Clinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said that he was speaking sarcastically).

2016年3月,GRU开始侵入克林顿竞选团队志愿者和员工的电子邮件账户,其中包括竞选团队主席约翰·波德斯塔。2016年4月,GRU侵入了民主党国会竞选委员会和民主党全国委员会的计算机网络。GRU从遭入侵的电子邮件账户和网络中窃取了数十万份文档。2016年6月中旬,民主党全国委员会公开俄罗斯政府在黑客行动中扮演的角色前后,GRU开始通过虚构的在线角色“DCLeaks”和“Guccifer 2.0”传播被盗材料。GRU后来通过维基解密发布了更多材料。维基解密称,特朗普的总统竞选团队(即“特朗普竞选团队”或“竞选团队”)对维基解密公布的文件表现出兴趣,并对这些文件有可能损害候选人克林顿表示欢迎。从2016年6月开始,【删减】向高级竞选官员预测,维基解密将发布对候选人克林顿有害的信息。维基解密的第一次发布是在2016年7月。大约在同一时间,候选人特朗普宣布,他希望俄罗斯能从克林顿担任国务卿期间使用的一台私人服务器上恢复据说已经丢失的电子邮件(他后来表示自己只是在讽刺)。


■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■WikiLeaks began releasing Podesta’s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section III of this Report details the Office’s investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.

【删减】维基解密于10月7日开始公布波德斯塔被盗的电子邮件。而就在不到一小时前,一家美国媒体发布了被认为对候选人特朗普有害的视频。本报告第三节详细介绍了对俄罗斯黑客行动的调查,以及特朗普竞选团队支持者为获取与克林顿有关的电子邮件所做的其他努力。


RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN

俄罗斯与竞选的联系


The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.

社交媒体运动和GRU的黑客行动,与特朗普竞选团队官员和一些与俄罗斯政府有关联的个人之间的一系列接触同时发生。(特别检察官)办公室调查了这些接触是否反映或导致了与俄罗斯共谋或合作干预选举活动的运动。尽管调查确定,俄罗斯政府相信自己将从特朗普担任总统的过程中受益,并努力确保这一结果;而且特朗普竞选团队预计,通过俄罗斯的努力,他们将从被窃取和发布的信息中获得选举上的利益。但调查并未确定特朗普竞选团队的成员与俄罗斯政府在其选举干预活动中共谋或合作。


The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person, invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order.

与俄罗斯的接触包括商业关系、向竞选活动提供援助、邀请候选人特朗普和普京会晤、邀请竞选官员和俄罗斯政府代表会晤,以及寻求改善美俄关系的政策立场。本报告第四节详细介绍了俄罗斯与特朗普竞选团队在竞选和过渡期间的接触,其中最突出的部分按时间顺序概述如下:


2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June 2016, including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump.

2015年 最早的一些接触与特朗普集团在俄罗斯的一个房地产项目—莫斯科特朗普大厦有关。候选人特朗普在2015年11月之前签署了一份莫斯科特朗普大厦的意向书,2016年1月,特朗普集团高管迈克尔·科恩通过电子邮件与俄罗斯政府新闻秘书德米特里·佩斯科夫的办公室谈论了该项目。特朗普集团至少在2016年6月仍然推进了该项目,包括考虑让科恩和候选人特朗普前往俄罗斯的计划。


Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had “dirt” on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place.、

2016年春 竞选外交政策顾问乔治·帕帕佐普洛斯早些时候与约瑟夫·米夫苏德进行了接触。米夫苏德是一名在伦敦的教授,与俄罗斯有联系,并于2016年4月前往莫斯科。米夫苏德结束那次访问回到伦敦后就立即告诉帕帕佐普洛斯,俄罗斯政府可以凭数千封电子邮件向希拉里·克林顿“泼脏水”。一周后,也就是2016年5月的第一周,帕帕佐普洛斯向一位外国政府代表暗示,特朗普竞选团队已经从俄罗斯政府那里获得了暗示,表明他们可以匿名发布对候选人克林顿有害的信息来协助竞选活动。在这期间和此后的几个月里,帕帕佐普洛斯与米夫苏德和两名俄罗斯国民合作,安排竞选团队与俄罗斯政府之间的会晤。但没有会晤举行。


Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as “official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary.” The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as “part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” The written communications setting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate Trump’s electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer’s presentation did not provide such information.

2016年夏天 俄罗斯与特朗普竞选团队的接触一直持续到2016年夏天,那时候选人特朗普已被看好将成为共和党的总统候选人。例如,2016年6月9日,一名俄罗斯律师会见了特朗普竞选团队的高级官员小唐纳德·特朗普、贾里德·库什纳和竞选主席保罗·马纳福特,提供了提议会面的电子邮件所称的“将希拉里定罪的官方文件和信息”。这些材料是提供给小特朗普的,作为“俄罗斯及其政府对特朗普支持的一部分”。安排会议的书面交流记录显示,竞选团队预计会收到俄罗斯提供的信息,这些信息可能有助于候选人特朗普的选举前景,但俄罗斯律师的陈述没有提供此类信息。


Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents. In July 2016, Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007. After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia. Page’s July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention. The Campaign then distanced itself from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign.

在2016年6月9日的会议几天后,2016年6月14日,一家网络安全公司和民主党全国委员会宣布,俄罗斯政府黑客侵入了民主党全国委员会的系统,并获得了对候选人特朗普的反对立场研究以及其他文件。2016年7月,竞选外交政策顾问卡特·佩奇以个人身份前往莫斯科,并在新经济学院发表了主旨演讲。佩奇在2003年至2007年期间曾在俄罗斯生活和工作。回到美国后,佩奇结识了至少两名俄罗斯情报官员,其中一人后来在2015年被指控作为俄罗斯的未注册特工犯下共谋罪。佩奇2016年7月对莫斯科的访问和他对亲俄外交政策的宣传引起了媒体的关注。随后,竞选团队与佩奇逐渐疏远,到2016年9月底,佩奇被逐出竞选团队。


July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign government reporting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.

2016年7月也是维基解密首次公布GRU从民主党全国委员会窃取的电子邮件的月份。2016年7月22日,维基解密发布了数千份民主党全国委员会内部文件,披露了克林顿竞选团队的信息。几天内,就有公开报道称,美国情报机构“高度相信”俄罗斯政府是从民主党全国委员会窃取电子邮件和文件的幕后黑手。在信息公开后的一周内,一个外国政府向FBI通报了2016年5月与帕帕佐普洛斯的互动,以及他关于俄罗斯政府可以协助特朗普竞选的声明。2016年7月31日,根据外国政府的报告,联邦调查局对俄罗斯政府与特朗普竞选团队相关个人之间的潜在合作展开了调查。


Separately, on August 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel’s Office was a “backdoor” way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump’s assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states. Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik, and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.

另外,2016年8月2日,特朗普竞选团队主席保罗·马纳福特在纽约市会见了他的长期商业伙伴康斯坦丁·基利姆尼克。联邦调查局评估,基利姆尼克与俄罗斯情报部门有联系。基利姆尼克要求会议亲自提交一份乌克兰和平计划,马纳福特向特别检察官办公室承认,这是俄罗斯控制乌克兰东部部分地区的“后备计划”;两人都认为,该计划需要得到候选人特朗普的同意(如果他当选总统)才能获得成功。他们还讨论了特朗普竞选团队的现状以及马纳福特提出的在中西部各州抢夺民主党选票的战略。在那次会议之前几个月,马纳福特已将内部投票数据与基利姆尼克分享,并在8月会议之后的一段时间内继续进行分享。


Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta’s emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement “that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations.” Those “thefts” and the “disclosures” of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, “are intended to interfere with the US election process.”

2016年秋季 2016年10月7日,媒体发布了候选人特朗普多年前绘声绘色地谈论女性的视频,这被认为对他的竞选前景造成损害。不到一小时后,维基解密再次发布了一系列文件:2016年3月下旬被GRU窃取的数千封约翰·波德斯塔的电子邮件。当时,联邦调查局和其他美国政府机构正在调查俄罗斯政府涉嫌干预总统选举的行为。同一天,即10月7日,国土安全部和国家情报总监办公室发表了一项联合公开声明,“即俄罗斯政府指示了最近对美国个人和机构,包括美国政治组织的电子邮件的窃取”。声明还说,这些“盗窃”和通过维基解密等在线平台“披露”被黑客攻击的材料,“都是为了干扰美国的选举进程”。


Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there.

2016年大选后 在11月8日的选举之后,俄罗斯政府官员和知名俄罗斯商人立即试图接触新政府。俄罗斯政府最高层也鼓励这些努力。俄罗斯大使馆在选举后几个小时进行了接触,向新当选总统表示祝贺,并安排与普京总统通话。几个俄罗斯商人在那里接过了这项工作。


Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, was among the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December, a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period, another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner’s friend collaborated on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

俄罗斯主权财富基金首席执行官基里尔·德米特里耶夫是试图与新一届政府接触的俄罗斯人之一。12月初,一位商业伙伴带领德米特里耶夫去见埃里克·普林斯,他是特朗普竞选的支持者,也是特朗普高级顾问史蒂夫·班农的助手。德米特里耶夫和普林斯随后于2017年1月在塞舌尔面对面会晤,讨论了美俄关系。在同一时期,另一名商业伙伴将德米特里耶夫介绍给库什纳的一位朋友,这位朋友没有在竞选或过渡团队中任职。德米特里耶夫和库什纳的朋友合作为美国和俄罗斯制定了一份简短的书面和解计划,德米特里耶夫暗示,该计划已通过普京批准。这位朋友在就职典礼前向库什纳递交了这份提案,库什纳后来将副本交给了班农和即将上任的国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森。


On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later, President-Elect Trump tweeted, “Great move on delay (by V. Putin).” The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result of Flynn’s request.

2016年12月29日,时任总统的奥巴马对干预选举的俄罗斯实施了制裁。新任国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林致电俄罗斯大使谢尔盖·基斯利亚克,要求俄罗斯不要因制裁而升级局势。第二天,普京宣布,俄罗斯不会对当时的制裁采取报复措施。几个小时后,当选总统特朗普在Twitter上写道,“(普京)伟大的延期举动“。第二天,2016年12月31日,基斯利亚克打电话给弗林,告诉他最高层已经收到了这一请求,俄罗斯选择按照弗林的请求不进行报复。


On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment — drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security Agency — that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means to assist Trump’s candidacy and harm Clinton’s. A declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day.

2017年1月6日,情报界成员向当选总统特朗普简要介绍了一项联合评估——由中央情报局、联邦调查局和国家安全局起草和协调——评估的结论是,俄罗斯通过各种手段干预选举,以协助特朗普竞选,并损害克林顿的竞选前景。该评估的解密版本在同一天公开发布。


Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees — the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC) — announced that they would conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI’s investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated:

2017年1月中旬至2017年2月初,三个国会委员会——众议院常设情报特别委员会、参议院情报特设委员会和参议院司法委员会宣布,它们将对俄罗斯干预选举进行调查,或已经在进行调查。当时的联邦调查局局长詹姆斯·科米后来向国会证实,联邦调查局对俄罗斯干预的调查是在选举前开始的。2017年3月20日,科米在向众议院常设情报特别委员会公开作证时指出:


I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts. ... As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.

司法部授权我确认,作为我们反情报任务的一部分,联邦调查局正在调查俄罗斯政府干预2016年总统选举的努力,其中包括调查与特朗普竞选团队和俄罗斯政府有关联的个人之间的任何联系,以及竞选活动和俄罗斯的行动之间是否存在任何协调举动。与任何反情报调查一样,这也将包括对是否犯下任何罪行进行评估。


The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9, 2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director — an action which is analyzed in Volume II of the report.


On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the investigation.

在接下来的七周里,调查在当时的科米局长的领导下继续进行,直到2017年5月9日特朗普总统解雇了科米——这一行动在报告的第二卷中进行了分析。


2017年5月17日,代理总检察长罗德·罗森斯坦任命了特别检察官,并授权他调查科米在国会证词中确认的内容,还有由调查直接产生的事项,以及“联邦最高法院判例汇编”第28编第600.4(A)节范围内的任何其他事项,其中一般包括干扰或阻碍调查的努力。


THE SPECIAL COUNSEL’S CHARGING DECISIONS

特别检察官的指控决定


In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report, the Office determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq. (2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if So, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual § 9-27.220.

在作出报告第一卷所述的指控决定时,检察官办公室确定其认定的行为是否违反了根据“联邦检察机关原则”应起诉的联邦刑法。详见“司法手册”§9-27.000及其后。(2018)。“司法手册”规定的标准是,该行为是否构成犯罪;如果构成犯罪,可采纳的证据是否可能足以获得和维持定罪;以及起诉是否符合联邦的重大利益,并且其他起诉或通过非刑事的替代手段不能充分满足这一利益。详见“司法手册”§9-27.220。


Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office’s charging decisions, which contain three main components.

First, the Office determined that Russia’s two principal interference operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election — the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations — violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. See United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.). Separately, Russian intelligence officers who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws, the federal computer-intrusion statute, and they have been so charged. See United States v. Netyksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215 (D.D.C.).

报告第五节详细解释了该办公室的指控决定,其中包括三个主要部分。

首先,该办公室认定,俄罗斯在2016年美国总统大选中的两项主要干预行动—社交媒体运动,以及黑客行动—违反了美国刑法。参与这场社交媒体运动的许多个人和实体被指控参与了欺诈美国的共谋罪,他们通过欺骗性行为破坏了联邦机构的工作,这些机构主要负责监管外国在美国选举中的影响力,以及相关的身份盗用罪名。详见 United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.)et al.,No.18-cr-32(D.C.)。另外,对民主党电脑和与克林顿竞选有关联的个人电子邮件账户实施黑客攻击的俄罗斯情报官员,除其他联邦法律外,还合谋违反了联邦计算机入侵法规,他们也受到了相应指控。详见United States v.Netyksho,et al.,No.18-cr-215(D.C.)。


■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks’s releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation.1 Further, the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.

【删减】其次,虽然调查发现与俄罗斯政府有联系的个人与特朗普竞选团队有关联,但证据不足以支持刑事指控。除其他外,证据不足以指控任何竞选官员为俄罗斯政府的未注册代理人或其他俄罗斯委托人。而且,我们关于2016年6月9日会议和维基解密发布的被黑客攻击的材料的证据,不足以指控违反竞选资金规定的犯罪行为。此外,这些证据不足以指控特朗普竞选团队的任何成员与俄罗斯政府代表合谋干预2016年的选举。


Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Moscow project.

第三,调查确定,与特朗普竞选团队有关联的几名个人在与俄罗斯关联个人的互动和相关事项上,向美国国家安全局和国会撒谎。这些谎言极大地损害了对俄罗斯干预选举的调查。该办公室指控其中一些谎言违反了联邦虚假陈述法规。前国家安全顾问迈克尔·弗林承认,他在过渡时期与俄罗斯大使基斯利亚克互动的事上撒谎。乔治·帕帕佐普洛斯是竞选期间的一名外交政策顾问,他承认在与约瑟夫·米夫苏德互动的性质和时机等问题上向调查人员撒谎。米夫苏德教授告诉帕帕佐普洛斯,俄罗斯以数千封电子邮件的形式掌握了候选人克林顿的丑闻。特朗普集团前律师迈克尔·科恩承认就特朗普的莫斯科项目向国会作出了虚假陈述。


■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ And in February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine.

【删减】在2019年2月,美国哥伦比亚特区地区法院发现,马纳福特在与康斯坦丁·基利姆尼克就特朗普竞选团队投票数据和乌克兰和平计划进行互动和沟通的问题上,对办公室和大陪审团撒了谎。


The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate’s April 2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that one Campaign official’s efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016 at Sessions’s Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign.

特别检察官办公室调查了其他几起据公开报道涉及与俄罗斯有关的潜在接触的事件。例如,调查确定,俄罗斯大使基斯利亚克和特朗普竞选团队官员在2016年4月华盛顿特区的外交政策演讲上,以及共和党召开代表大会的那一周进行了简短、公开和非实质性的接触。而且,调查并未证实,一名竞选官员试图淡化共和党关于向乌克兰提供援助的部分纲领,是应候选人特朗普或俄罗斯的要求进行的。调查同时无法确定,在基斯利亚克和塞申斯于2016年9月在塞申斯的参议院办公室举行的会议,除了顺便提到总统竞选之外,还提到了其他内容。


The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office’s judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other witnesses and information — such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the media — in light of internal Department of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice Manual §§ 9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or “taint”) team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well — numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United States.

调查并不总是能提供可接受的信息或证词,也不能全面了解调查对象所开展的活动。一些个人援引“第五修正案”规定的权利,反对强迫自证其罪,根据办公室的判断,他们不是获得豁免的适当候选人。检察官办公室根据司法部的内部政策,遏制了对其他证人和信息的追踪,例如律师或声称是媒体成员的个人所知的信息,详见“司法手册”§9-13.400,13.410。此外,通过法院程序获得的一些信息被推定包含在法律特权范围内,并由一个过滤(或“污点”)小组对调查人员进行筛选。即使在个人作证或同意接受面谈时,他们有时也会提供虚假或不完整的信息,导致上文所述的一些虚假陈述指控。此外,检察官办公室在获取相关证据的能力方面也面临实际限制——许多证人和涉案人员生活在国外,文件也被保存在美国境外。


Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we investigated — including some associated with the Trump Campaign-deleted relevant communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In such cases, the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared inconsistent with other known facts.


Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps, the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.

此外,办公室了解到,我们采访的一些人或我们调查的一些人——包括一些与特朗普竞选有关的人——删除了相关通信,或在有关时间段使用具有加密功能或不能长期保留数据或通信记录的应用程序进行通信。在这种情况下,检察官办公室无法通过当时的沟通内容来证实证人的陈述,也无法就与其他已知事实不符的陈述向证人提出充分的问题。


因此,尽管本报告体现了检察官办公室认为尽可能准确和完整的事实和法律裁定,但鉴于这些已查明的差距,检察官办公室不能排除这样一种可能性:即未能得到的资料将对报告中所述的事件提供额外或全新的说明。


您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 注册

手机版|www.hutong9.net

GMT-5, 2019-8-20 01:29 PM , Processed in 0.106841 second(s), 24 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X2.5

© 2001-2012 Comsenz Inc.

回顶部